Bad advice from the past

At the latest since the inconclusive end of the Ukrainian summer offensive two years ago, it should be clear that the Russian-Ukrainian war will eventually have to be ended through negotiations, especially since the US, at least, is not prepared to escalate the conflict indefinitely.

Anyone who compared the strengths of Russia and Ukraine at the turn of 2021/2022 and assessed their tasks, resources, and territory had to conclude that a military stalemate would eventually force negotiations. A sober assessment of the Russian army's forces and capabilities in particular had suggested that Russia would not be able to conquer the whole of Ukraine. At that time, its offensive power extended to a maximum of 200, perhaps 300 km beyond the borders of Russia or its allies (1). Even after the spectacular and, in some cases, surprisingly deep advances in March 2022, the Russians never quite reached this line.

The Ukrainian incursion into the Kursk region was apparently also undertaken at the instigation of NATO advisers so that Ukrainian President Zelensky could gain control of Russian territory, which he could then use as a bargaining chip in exchange for Russian-occupied territories. Such an undertaking only made sense if both Kyiv and Brussels assumed that negotiations would have to be held sooner or later. Undeterred by this, however, the Russian army has slowly but steadily continued its advance, which began in February 2014, and shows no signs of stopping for the time being. Even if maximum territorial demands cannot be achieved militarily, the Kremlin is currently determined to go as far as it can. Whether this corresponds to the maps that have been circulating for several weeks and allegedly provide information about which areas Russia wants to annex by the end of this war is questionable (2). They correspond to a Western interpretation.

Hoping for a decisive battle?

Since the breakdown of the ceasefire negotiations in Istanbul, a war of attrition has been underway in which Western Europe is attempting to provide Ukraine, which is inferior in terms of resources, with its own resources—with the exception of personnel—so that it can continue the war. Despite all the media hype, a turning point in this war in the form of a decisive battle or a decisive blow is hardly to be expected. Rather, the West's declared aim is to put Ukraine in the most favorable negotiating position possible and to inflict as much damage as possible on Russia. That is probably all that can be achieved.

In general, it seems that in recent years the West has never properly assessed Russia's objectives in the war in Ukraine. There are several reasons for this: on the one hand, no one ever listened when Russian officials made their statements, and when they were listened to, their pronouncements were dismissed as propaganda. On the other hand, the West is unfamiliar with Russian military thinking or interprets it through Western concepts, particularly through the lens of Prussian general and military theorist Carl von Clausewitz. The West has projected its own ambitions in the wars of the past 30 years onto the Russians in Ukraine. This has led to enormous misjudgments that are now almost impossible to correct because doing so would mean losing face.

Goal and purpose in war

Clausewitz is most often quoted as saying that war is the continuation of politics by other means. This quote—or rather, its misinterpretation—has caused much harm throughout history by leading politicians, diplomats, and military leaders to assume that diplomatic negotiations and military combat follow each other sequentially. If one method no longer achieves progress, then one must simply try the other. Although the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928 no longer grants governments this freedom of choice, the Argentine junta under Leopoldo Galtieri must have believed in 1982, after protracted negotiations with the British over the ownership of the Falkland Islands, that it was permissible to launch a military operation that would be accepted by the international community (4).

Perhaps more important is another statement by Clausewitz: he devoted an entire chapter of his famous work “On War” from 1831 to the question of the purpose and goal of war: anyone who wages war must know what they want to achieve with and in their war. This is by no means an academic question, because the answer determines when a belligerent power will withdraw from the war or adjust its war aims. Anyone who enters into negotiations with their enemy should be informed about the purposes and objectives that the enemy is pursuing or striving for. At a time when anyone who reflects on Russia's motives in the Ukraine war is labeled a Putin sympathizer, it is unlikely that a realistic assessment will be made. However, the consequences of a misjudgment could be fatal in a situation where nothing less than nuclear war is looming.

The dogma of the decisive battle

Clausewitz's magnum opus, On War, is based on his knowledge of military history and his own experiences as a participant in the wars of his time.

The latter—specifically the Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Coalition Wars—were all decided within a few weeks in major decisive battles. This gave rise to the concept of the decisive battle—the swift, devastating battle—which has been considered a model for warfare ever since (5).

A key milestone in Carl von Clausewitz's experience was the campaign of 1806, in which the Prussian army was defeated in the twin battles of Jena and Auerstedt (6). This essentially decided the Fourth Coalition War. Although individual parts of the defeated Prussian army continued to fight for months, they were unable to change the outcome of the war. After the fortresses of Breslau, Brieg, Glogau, Danzig, Glatz, and Neisse had fallen and the French had reached East Prussia, the Prussian king was forced to sign the Treaty of Tilsit in July 1807 (7).

It was this belief in the decisive battle that drove Napoleon to march rapidly to Belgium in June 1815, and it was probably the same haste that prompted him, after two successful but inconclusive battles at Quatre Bras and Ligny on June 16, 1815, to risk a battle south of Brussels just two days later under what were actually unfavorable conditions (8). Wellington's army was in a strong position at Waterloo, and heavy rainfall had softened the terrain to such an extent that the effectiveness of the French artillery was limited (9). Nevertheless, Napoleon sought battle – and was defeated.

As one of the most famous battles in world history, the Battle of Waterloo has shaped the perception of a broad public in Europe and probably still influences the Western understanding of victory in a campaign, even though neither the First nor the Second World War were decided by individual battles or operations, but by long-lasting campaigns that culminated in actual attrition warfare.

Operational accidents in military history?

However, the Germans were not the only ones, nor were they the first, to adhere to the dogma of the decisive battle. Even in ancient China, Sun Tzu is said to have been one of the advocates of this dogma. At least, he is credited with the saying that war loves victory, not duration (10). But even ancient China experienced a different reality: the Warring States period lasted over 200 years and only ended when the Qin Empire prevailed over its six rivals and established itself as the leading power.

The students of Carl von Clausewitz repeatedly planned short campaigns with quick decisive battles. A typical example of this was the Franco-Prussian War of 1870/71, which was de facto decided after the Battle of Sedan on September 1/2, 1870, although the republic was proclaimed in Paris after the capture of Napoleon III, which continued the war for several more months. But after Sedan, even hastily reorganized armies cobbled together from the remnants of the defeated army were no longer able to turn the tide. This war remained the dominant war experience of the Germans, who had to regard it as an occupational hazard of war history that in 1914 the planned defeat of France within the six weeks envisaged by the Schlieffen Plan did not succeed. This was followed by a long, grueling war of attrition that claimed such heavy casualties that the consequences remained visible in the demographics of France and Germany for decades to come.

Beyond the culmination point

A second personal experience of Carl von Clausewitz, which he had already had on the Russian side, was the Sixth Coalition War, which began in 1812 with Napoleon's campaign against Russia. This campaign, known in Russia as the Patriotic War, was lost for the Corsican because he failed to bring the Russians to a decisive battle. At the Battle of Borodino on September 7, 1812, the Russians began their retreat before Napoleon was able to inflict a decisive defeat on them. Not even the capture of Moscow could persuade the Tsar to surrender. This campaign may have prompted Clausewitz to develop his theory of the culminating point, which still haunts the minds of NATO planners today. The culminating point of a war refers to the peak at which the fighting is most intense and both sides are pushed to the limits of their capabilities. When one side collapses, the situation often changes quickly and radically.

The Battle of Waterloo is another example of a culmination point, because Napoleon, believing that the deployment of the Old Guard could still bring about a decision, exhausted his last reserves in the evening, which were the only ones that could have covered an orderly retreat. When the Old Guard was defeated, there were no troops left to prevent the armies of the allied British, Dutch, North Germans, and Prussians from pursuing and crushing the French army “to the last man and horse” (11).

Clausewitz vs. Vo Nguyen Giap

Clausewitz's ideas influenced generations of military leaders, including NATO planners in the 20th century. The concept of a short, decisive war is and remains dominant. Today's NATO assessment and planning procedures are heavily influenced by the experiences of the two campaigns in Iraq in 1991 and 2003, in which a coalition of the willing brought about a decision within days in short ground offensives, after several weeks of preparation through air strikes. Although atypical in their brevity for wars since 1914, these campaigns have shaped public and political consciousness in the West, and now people are surprised at the course of the war in Ukraine.

Due to its limited resources, Israel also sought a quick decisive battle in the wars of 1956, 1967, and 1973. The German-Israeli military historian and brigadier general Jehuda Wallach has written extensively on this subject (12). His reflections could have served as a warning to Israel for many years: Israel will not be able to guarantee its security exclusively with short campaigns and quickly brought about decisive battles, because Israel's enemies have learned their lesson. Since the Palestinian uprising after 1987—the so-called first Intifada—Israel has been embroiled in a war against sworn enemies who proceed with great strategic patience. Blitzkrieg-style advances by tank units, air strikes, and even nuclear strikes are not effective means of countering this.

Since the end of World War II, Western forces have rarely been able to win any of the protracted guerrilla wars waged by liberation movements and young states, particularly in the wake of decolonization. In protracted conflicts—the best known being Vietnam, the most recent Afghanistan—the concept of a short war decided by a swift decisive battle has failed. The most famous strategist of attrition warfare is the legendary Vietnamese general Vo Nguyen Giap. The desire to avoid long wars of attrition remains a central concern of Western strategists to this day. It may have prompted the development of US Colonel John Warden's doctrine of air warfare against the “five circles,” which is currently setting the tone.

Strategic patience

But long before the wars of the French Revolution, short campaigns marked by decisive battles were the rule rather than the exception. Around 150 years before these, the generals of the Habsburg Emperor Leopold I had demonstrated the strategic patience that Napoleon so sorely lacked in the campaigns of the Great Turkish War from 1683 to 1699.

Unlike Napoleon and Clausewitz, commanders in the 17th and 18th centuries, such as Prince Eugene of Savoy and Margrave Ludwig of Baden, were accustomed to seeking a decisive battle not at the earliest opportunity, but when circumstances were favorable. They decided their campaigns against the Ottoman Empire not through hasty attacks, but through tactical waiting and prompt exploitation of their opponents' weaknesses. The victories of the Imperial forces at Slankamen in 1691 (14) and at Zenta in 1697 (15) show that patience and operational flexibility are often more effective than the urge to fight a quick decisive battle.

Margrave Ludwig of Baden – also known as Türkenlouis – showed great patience in the days leading up to the Battle of Slankamen on August 19, 1691. Ludwig considered his army to be superior in combat strength to the numerically stronger Turkish enemy, and he avoided a battle after the Turks had entrenched themselves in a strongly fortified position that Ludwig could not attack without taking a great risk (16). In order to lure the Turks into an open field battle, he therefore maneuvered his army into a supposedly weak position. In the ensuing battle, the Turks suffered such heavy losses that they were unable to wage offensive warfare for a long time afterwards.

The Austrian commander Prince Eugene of Savoy demonstrated patience and determination at the right moment before the Battle of Zenta in present-day Serbia on September 11, 1697. In the final days of the campaign, he recognized a moment of weakness on the part of the Turks when they set out to withdraw from the theater of war and move to their winter quarters. Eugene, who was basically ordered to remain defensive, sought battle the moment he saw that his numerically superior Turkish opponent was about to cross the Tisza River. During the crossing, the two parts of the Turkish army on opposite banks of the river were unable to support each other (17). Eugene resolutely exploited this moment of weakness to crush the Turkish army and inflict losses from which the Ottoman Empire would not recover for years.

A different perspective and a different way of thinking

Russian military thinking is not as one-sidedly focused on Clausewitz as Western thinking is. Clausewitz, who entered Russian service after Prussia's defeat in the war of 1806/07, was and still is controversial in Russia. A quick decisive battle is just one of several options available when planning an operation or campaign. The other is to wage a war of attrition, and in light of Vladimir Putin's statements at the beginning of the war in Ukraine, it can be assumed that the Russians at least considered a war of attrition from the outset, because the aim of “demilitarization” was to decimate what was then the second strongest army on the European continent and to destroy the fanatically fighting volunteer units of Ukrainian nationalists (18). Gaining territory is secondary; what is decisive is the continued weakening of the enemy to the point where it can no longer offer organized resistance. At present, it looks as if the Russians are succeeding in doing just that. In the run-up to negotiations, the Russians have demanded the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the areas they want to bring under their control, but they know that they can achieve this goal by continuing to weaken Ukrainian forces. Where these battles take place is irrelevant.

If we assume today that Russia is at war with the West, which has a fundamental advantage in terms of resources – and this view is currently prevalent in military circles in Russia – then a war of attrition against an opponent whose freedom of action is limited may well make sense. From a Russian national perspective, despite the territorial gains made by the offensives since fall 2023, the primary goal cannot be to occupy further territory, but rather to continue the fight in preparation for the decisive battle when the time is ripe and conditions are favorable.

From a continental, Eurasian perspective, however, it is now advantageous, perhaps even necessary, to wage a war of attrition against an opponent whose freedom of action is limited because it can only strike Russia from Ukrainian territory. Launching strikes from the territory of NATO allies would undoubtedly conjure up the danger of a global nuclear war, which the US wants to avoid. Furthermore, with its campaign against Ukraine's economy and infrastructure, Russia has clearly demonstrated what happens to countries that make themselves available as staging areas for Russia: they are devastated.

Bad advisors

The fighting in the spring of 2022 ended in a stalemate because the Ukrainians were not prepared to accept a battle in the border area and instead withdrew far back. Conversely, the Russians did not exceed the limits of their military capabilities at that time and retreated to lines that they were able to hold. Since then, a war of attrition has been raging, the end of which depends on who believes they must bring about a decisive battle or strike a decisive blow. If one of the parties then goes for broke and uses its last reserves, the climax can quickly be reached and the situation can tip. Fanaticism or excessive self-confidence can then turn against the originator itself. In this war of nerves, the Russian side has so far proved to be very patient. In an atmosphere that has been cultivated for years, in which a willingness to negotiate is fundamentally interpreted as weakness, the probability that one of the sides will miss the right moment to exit the war is high (19). Clausewitz could prove to be a very bad advisor.

Notes:

1. The author expressed this view in an article published in the Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift ASMZ. See "Leistungsfähigkeit und Einsatzgrundsätze der russischen Armee" at ASMZ Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift, Nr. 01/02/2017, pp. 5-7, online at https://www.e-periodica.ch/digbib/view?lang=de&pid=asm-004%3A2017%3A183%3A%3A10 and repeated it in a broadcast on the television channel Alpenparlament.tv on January 29, 2022.

2. See “Кремль усиливает претензии. Сальдо озвучил намерения РФ по захвату Днепропетровщины, Херсонщины и Запорожья по оба берега Днепра — ISW,” at NV New Voice, April 22, 2025, online at https://nv.ua/ukraine/events/rossiya-pretenduet-na-tri-oblasti-ukrainy-po-oboim-beregam-dnepra-kakie-eto-territorii-novosti-ukrainy-50508109.html, based on a map from the Institute for the Study of War.

3. The author gave this assessment in a lecture to the editorial staff of the Swiss newspaper “Zeitfragen” on April 18, 2022, in the St. Gallen region.

4. After the Conservative Party's election victory in 1979 and the appointment of Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister, the talks between Great Britain and Argentina became increasingly non-committal on the British side, giving the Argentinians the impression that they were being put off indefinitely. At the time, Buenos Aires assumed that the US would not support Great Britain in a war in the South Atlantic. For a brief overview, see Wolfgang Etschmann: 25 years ago: Vor 25 Jahren: Der Krieg um die Falkland-Inseln – ein untypischer Krieg, in Truppendienst, issue 296, edition 2, 2007, online at https://www.bmlv.gv.at/truppendienst/ausgaben/artikel.php?id=565. For more on the Briand-Kellogg Pact, see “Briand-Kellogg Pact” at LeMo, Lebendiges Museum Online, May 9, 2025, online at https://www.dhm.de/lemo/kapitel/weimarer-republik/aussenpolitik/briand-kellogg-pakt.html; English text on the Yale University website at https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/kbpact.asp.

5. See Carl von Clausewitz: On War; posthumous work of General Carl von Clausewitz, Berlin 1832–1834 (edited by Marie von Clausewitz. An electronic version of the work can be found online at https://clausewitzstudies.org/readings/VomKriege1832/Book1.htm#1-8.

6. The most authoritative account currently available is by Gerd Fesser: 1806: Die Doppelschlacht bei Jena und Auerstedt (Napoleon's Battles), Jena 2006. See “Jena und Auerstedt,” at Preussenweb, October 14, 1806, online at http://www.preussenweb.de/jena.htm. Experimental documentation of the double battle of Jena and Auerstedt, created in 2006/2007 at the Faculty of Media, Bauhaus University Weimar, online at https://www.dailymotion.com/ related/x747aq/video/x6flxx_1806_videogames?hmz=74616272656c61746564. See also Carl von Clausewitz: Nachrichten über Preußen in seiner größten Katastrophe (News about Prussia in its greatest catastrophe) (1823/24). Excerpts reprinted in: Gerhard Förster (ed.): Carl von Clausewitz – Selected Military Writings. Berlin 1981, pp. 76–124. On Carl von Clausewitz, see Alois Friedel: Carl von Clausewitz and the Impact of his Theory of War; Thoughts on the 200th anniversary of his birth on June 1, 1980, in APuZ Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 22/1980, on the homepage of the State Agency for Civic Education, May 31, 1980, online at https://www.bpb.de/shop/zeitschriften/apuz/archiv/531604/ carl-von-clausewitz-und-die-auswirkungen-seiner-theorie-vom-kriege-gedanken-zur-200-wiederkehr-seines-geburtstages-am-1-juni-1980/.

7. The original text of the Treaty of Tilsit (in French and German) on the Westphalian History website, available online at https://www.lwl.org/westfaelische-geschichte/que/normal/que801.pdf. The fortresses of Kolberg, Glatz, Graudenz, Silberberg, Kosel, and Pillau managed to hold out until the Peace of Tilsit was signed on July 7, 1807. In 1945, Nazi propaganda devoted a great deal of attention to the fate of Kolberg in a film designed to encourage people to “hold out.”

8. See Klaus-Dieter Krug: Der Feldzug in den Tagen des 14. Juni bis 19. Juni 1815, on the Clausewitz Thoughts homepage by Antonia Drechsler, online at https://clausewitzgedanken.de/der-feldzug-in-den-tagen-des-14-juni-bis-19-juni-1815/.

9. Numerous accounts have been written about the Battle of Waterloo. The most recent in German-speaking countries are by Klaus-Jürgen Bremm: Die Schlacht: Waterloo 1815 (The Battle: Waterloo 1815), Darmstadt 2025, and by Gerd Fesser: 1815: Waterloo – Napoleons letzte Schlacht (Napoleon's Last Battle) (Napoleon's Battles), Jena 2015. The best known of the numerous videos and film adaptations is probably the film “Waterloo” by Soviet director Sergei Bondarchuk from 1970, available on YouTube at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D9uL2K5DgkQ, in French.

10. The work “The Art of War” (or “Sunzi on the Art of War”) by Sun Tzu is one of the earliest books on strategy and is still considered one of the most important works on this subject today. See Harro von Senger: Meister Suns Kriegskanon. Translated from Chinese and annotated by Harro von Senger, Stuttgart 2011. Sun Bin, one of Sun Tzu's students, also wrote a book on the art of war: “Sūn Bìn bīngfǎ” – Sun Bin on the Art of War.

11. The saying comes from the order given by Prussian Field Marshal Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher to pursue the French after the Battle of Waterloo. See Florian Stark: How the Prussians outwitted Emperor Napoleon at Waterloo, in Die Welt, June 18, 2021, online at https://www.welt.de/geschichte/kopf-des-tages/article231910873/Bluecher-So-tricksten-die-Preussen-Napoleon-bei-Waterloo-aus. html#:~:text=Gebhard%20Leberecht%20von%20Blücher%20(1742%E2%80%931819)%20was%20not%20exactly,almost%20led%20to%20catastrophe.

12. See Jehuda Lothar Wallach: Das Dogma der Vernichtungsschlacht. Die Lehren von Clausewitz und Schlieffen und ihre Wirkungen in zwei Weltkriegen, translated from English by Hans Jürgen Baron von Koskull, published by the Working Group for Defense Research, Frankfurt am Main, 1967, and Jehuda L. Wallach: The Dogma of Annihilation, The Lessons of Clausewitz and Schlieffen and Their Impact on Two World Wars, Munich 1970.

13. See "Vo Nguyen Giap – der weltweit brillante General", at Vietnam im Zeitalter des Aufstiegs, August 25, 2021, online at https://vovworld.vn/de-DE/politische-aktualitat/vo-nguyen-giap-der-weltweit-brillante-general-1019298.vov. An obituary: „Vietnam trauert um den ‚roten Napoleon‘“, in Spiegel Ausland, October 4, 2013, online at https://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/general-vo-nguyen-giap-in-vietnam-gestorben-a-926161.html.

14. For the Battle of Slankamen, see “Die Schlacht von Slankamen” (The Battle of Slankamen), at Karlsruher Türkenbeute, published by the Badisches Landesmuseum, Karlsruhe, online at http://www.tuerkenbeute.de/kun/kun_lou/SchlachtSlankamen_de.php. The most important source on this: Ludwig Wilhelm's victory report after the Battle of Slankamen Source: Margrave Ludwig Wilhelm of Baden-Baden (1655-1707), report to Emperor Leopold I with victory report regarding the Battle of Slankamen, August 20, 1691, Vienna, War Archives. Field files 1691-8-1, online at https://web.archive.org/web/20160306010756/http://www.tuerkenbeute.de/res/pdf/forschung/nachweise/quellen/Slankamen.pdf. A video on this topic, “The Great Turkish War: EP6 Battle of Slankamen - Season 1”, at TKHistory documentary on YouTube, August 10, 2024, online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8QU4X4VD28E.

15. For the Battle of Zenta, see Joachim Bahlcke: Die Schlacht bei Zenta und die Eroberung Sarajevos 1697 (The Battle of Zenta and the Conquest of Sarajevo in 1697), in: Ostdeutsche Gedenktage. Persönlichkeiten und historische Ereignisse (East German Commemoration Days. Personalities and Historical Events). Vol. 33 (1997), pp. 287–293 and Joachim Bahlcke: Schlacht bei Zenta und Eroberung Sarajevos, published by the Cultural Foundation of German Expellees for Science and Research, 2025, online at https://kulturstiftung.org/zeitstrahl/schlacht-bei-zenta-und-eroberung-sarajevos. The video “Battle of Zenta, 1697, the battle Napoleon studied; Eugene's masterpiece, part 3,” at HistoryMarche on YouTube, December 9, 2022, online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vfv03lFSxto is not satisfactory. See the video “Battle of Zenta (1697). Great Turkish War (1683-1699),” at War History on YouTube, August 1, 2023, online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KHxbSBOu65s&t=119s.

16. For more on Margrave Ludwig of Baden – known as “Türkenlouis” (Turkish Louis) – see Christian Greiner: Der “Türkenlouis” – Margrave Ludwig of Baden-Baden (1655–1707), in: Militärgeschichtliche Beiträge, vol. 3, (ed. by the Military History Research Office), Herford/Bonn 1989, pp. 27–41, and “Ludwig Wilhelm, Margrave of Baden-Baden (Türken-Louis),” in Deutsche Biographie, online at https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/sfz54702.html#ndbcontent.

17. For Prince Eugene of Savoy, see “Eugen Prinz von Savoyen” in the German Biography, online at https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/sfz52925.html#ndbcontent. The documentary film "Prinz Eugen und das osmanische Reich, Barock Doku" by Timeline Deutschland on YouTube, July 22, 2022, online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DSVuayhisa0, hardly does justice to the events.

18. See "Kriegserklärung. Die Ansprache des russländischen Präsidenten am Morgen des 24.2.2022", translated from Russian by Volker Weichsel and Olga Radetzkaja, at Osteuropa.de, online at https://zeitschrift-osteuropa.de/blog/vladimir-putin-ansprache-am-fruehen-morgen-des-24.2.2022/, original Russian speech on the Kremlin website, online at http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843.

19. The author was able to observe the emergence of this atmosphere for himself during his years of work at the headquarters of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in Vienna